Study challenges assumptions on moral reasoning in autistic adults

New research suggests autistic adolescents and adults demonstrate moral judgments similar to neurotypical peers, emphasising differences in processing harm and intention rather than moral capacity.

A new exploratory study in the Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders suggests that autistic adolescents and adults reach moral judgements that are broadly similar to those of neurotypical peers, even if they appear to weigh context in slightly different ways. Led by Margherita Attanasio and Monica Mazza at e-Campus University and the University of L’Aquila, the research examined how people respond to classic moral dilemmas involving harm, intention and personal risk, while also testing whether Machiavellianism played any part in those choices.

The work sits within a long-running debate in psychology. Some earlier theories linked autism with weaker empathy or Theory of Mind, the ability to infer what other people think or intend, and suggested this might change moral reasoning. But more recent research has challenged the idea that autistic people are somehow morally deficient. Studies indexed by PubMed and published in the same journal have explored how Theory of Mind, causal judgement and age-related development shape moral decisions in autism, while a 2024 paper in Molecular Autism examined broader moral foundations in autistic people and those with a systemising cognitive style.

In the Italian study, 20 autistic participants and 29 neurotypical participants were asked to judge a series of moral dilemmas that varied in two key ways: whether harm was a side effect or the means to an end, and whether the decision-maker’s own life was at risk. Participants also completed measures of empathy, Theory of Mind and Machiavellianism, a personality trait associated with cynicism, manipulation and emotional detachment. The pattern that emerged was familiar in one sense: both groups were more willing to accept harm when it was incidental than when it was used instrumentally, reflecting the usual tension between outcome-based and rule-based moral reasoning.

The finer details, however, pointed to a more nuanced picture. The shift away from utilitarian choices in instrumental dilemmas was present in both groups, but it was smaller among autistic participants. Personal danger also had different effects: neurotypical participants became more utilitarian when their own lives were threatened, while that factor did not significantly alter judgements in the autistic group. At the same time, the autistic participants reported lower empathy and weaker Theory of Mind, but their Machiavellianism scores did not differ from those of the comparison group.

That last finding matters. If autistic moral decisions were driven by cold, calculating indifference, one might expect higher Machiavellianism, but the study found no such difference. Related research has already shown that moral reasoning in autism is shaped by intentionality and causal understanding, not simply by a lack of concern for others. Other work has also suggested that utilitarian judgements in autism vary across childhood and adolescence, and that social cognition, not personality pathology, is often the better lens through which to interpret these choices.

The authors caution that the study is exploratory and based on a modest sample, so it does not settle the debate. Even so, it adds to a growing body of evidence that autistic people are not morally impaired, but may process harm, intention and self-interest differently. For clinicians, educators and families, that is an important distinction: differences in moral response do not amount to a lack of moral feeling.